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1. Introduction 
A good place to start when explaining and motivating what is variously called conceptual 
engineering, conceptual ethics, and ameliorative projects is the following passage from Nietzsche: 
 
What dawns on philosophers last of all: they must no longer accept concepts as a gift, nor merely 
purify and polish them, but first make and create them, present them and make them convincing. 
Hitherto one has generally trusted one’s concepts as if they were a wonderful dowry from some 
sort of wonderland: but they are, after all, the inheritance from our most remote, most foolish as 
well as most intelligent ancestors. […] What is needed above all is an absolute skepticism toward 
all inherited concepts…1 
 
Nietzsche puts this in characteristically dramatic terms. Put less dramatically, the basic idea is that 
there are concepts other than those we actually have and employ, and some of those concepts may 
be better suited for various purposes than our actual ones are. We can and should question our 
concepts, and consider whether there are better ones out there. And insofar as there are better ones 
out there, we should try to change our ways so that we come to employ the better concepts. There is 
then a philosophical project of critically assessing, and potentially revising or replacing, concepts.  
 
I will later say more about how to understand the talk of concepts here. But there is one thing it is 
important to be clear on right away. The project is not just one of critically assessing our theories of 
various subject matters. It is one of critically assessing the concepts themselves, where “concepts” 
are the basic representational building-blocks of thought. Sometimes in ordinary language, “concept” 
is used loosely, in such a way that mere changes in theory trivially count as changing one’s “concept”. 
Here I will employ a concept/conception distinction, such that while such changes trivially count as 
changing one’s conception of the matter at hand, it is a further question whether this counts as a 
revision of the concept itself. Maybe in some cases it does, but it is a theoretically contentious 
matter if and when it is so.2 
 
This project described is not a new one. Philosophers have often (or always?) to some extent 
critically assessed concepts, coming up with their own technical concepts where the old concepts 
have not seemed up to the task, as well as revise and criticize existing concepts. Within the analytic 
philosophy tradition, Carnap (1950, ch. 1) and Quine (1960) both prominently stress explication. 
Within the continental tradition, theorists like Heidegger make up their own concepts for describing 
the world. Brandom (2002) describes Leibniz, Spinoza and Hegel as conceptual engineers.3 As 
displayed by the passage quoted above, conceptual engineering is a central theme in Nietzsche. And 
these are just a few examples. But what arguably is new is systematically studying conceptual 
engineering, where that involves finding features common to seemingly quite disparate conceptual 
engineering projects and delving into general questions raised by such projects. For example, it can 
be claimed that the revision and replacement of concepts isn’t always self-conscious, and by making 
 
1 Nietzsche (1901/68), section 409. 
2 On concept/conception distinctions similar to that drawn here, see, e.g., Rawls (1971), Higginbotham (1998), 
and Ezcurdia (1998). 
3 Brandom (2002), p. 116. 
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explicit what we are doing and being more systematic we can do it better; and by comparing 
conceptual engineering projects from different parts of philosophy we can shed useful light on them. 
Much of the discussion below will concern the study of conceptual engineering – the newer 
development – rather than the activity of conceptual engineering itself. There has been a flurry of 
work on conceptual engineering in recent years. There is too much to usefully list or summarize, but 
among more important work can be mentioned Burgess and Plunkett’s pioneering articles (2013) and 
(2013a), Cappelen (2018), Scharp (2013), the essays collected in Haslanger (2012), and the essays 
collected in Burgess, Cappelen and Plunkett (forthcoming). 
 
In the discussion below I will keep returning to paradigm examples of conceptual engineering from 
the recent literature: Sally Haslanger on the concept WOMAN and Kevin Scharp on the concept TRUTH.4 
This is partly for the sake of convenience. These examples are often discussed, and well-known. But it 
should be kept in mind that these are just some of many examples. 
 
Different labels have recently been used for the kind of project I will describe – “conceptual 
engineering”, “conceptual ethics”, and “ameliorative project”. For the purposes of my discussion 




Here, in brief, are Haslanger’s and Scharp’s ideas. 
 
Haslanger thinks that we should replace the actually used concept WOMAN by the following one: 
 
S is a woman iff S is systematically subordinated along some dimension (economic, political, legal, 
social, etc.), and S is "marked" as a target for this treatment by observed or imagined bodily 
features presumed to be evidence of a female’s biological role in reproduction.6 
 
The motivation, put briefly, is that there is oppression of the kind described, and employing a 
concept that captures that is a way of raising the fact to salience, in a way that helps combat this 
oppression. I should perhaps stress that Haslanger at least sometimes clearly speaks of changing our 
conception of the concept WOMAN rather than changing the concept WOMAN itself: she emphasizes 
that how the concept seems to us (“the manifest concept”) differs from how the concept really 
works (“the operative concept”).7 However, in the discussion to follow my focus will be on Haslanger 
qua conceptual engineer. 
 
Scharp argues that our concept TRUTH is in a certain sense inconsistent, in a way that comes to light 
through semantic paradoxes such as the liar paradox. He then goes on to argue that because the 
concept TRUTH is inconsistent we should replace it, and he proposes as replacement a pair of 
concepts which together can do the work that, in theoretical contexts, we want the concept TRUTH to 
do for us.8 The differences between Haslanger’s and Scharp’s projects are stark, which is one reason 
for juxtaposing them in the context of discussing conceptual engineering. The concepts they focus on 
are obviously very different, and the considerations they bring to bear are also different. 
 
4 See primarily Haslanger (2000) and (forthcoming (a)), and Scharp (2013). 
5 The expression “conceptual engineering” was apparently first used by Creath (1991). Other early uses are 
found in Blackburn (1999) and Brandom (2001). “Ameliorative project” is Haslanger’s expression (in earlier 
work she used “analytic” rather than “ameliorative”). “Conceptual ethics” is the preferred label of Burgess and 
Plunkett (2013, 2013a).  
6 Haslanger (2000), p. 39. In her more recent (forthcoming (a)), Haslanger includes a relativization to contexts. 
7 See Haslanger (2006), p. 110) and Haslanger (2012) p. 15. For discussion, see section 7.6 of Cappelen (2018). 
8 Scharp develops the idea in many places, but see primarily his (2013). 
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3. Preliminary remarks 
Armed with these very brief sketches of two prominent conceptual engineering projects, let me now 
address some questions which likely arise. 
 
What are concepts? There is no uncontroversial answer to this question. At a first stab, they are the 
basic building blocks of thoughts, or of the thoughts that have something like linguistic structure. 
Perhaps one can say that concepts are the meanings of (subsentential) expressions.9 Needless to say, 
these characterizations carry theoretical baggage, and can be questioned. And even if the latter gloss 
can be defended, it is only moderately helpful, for example because there are different theories of 
what meanings are. One important distinction between views on meaning is that between views on 
the meaning of an expression is its intension, and views on which meaning is something more fine-
grained which determines its intension. Some authors in the conceptual engineering literature, e.g. 
Scharp, approach meaning and concepts via the question of what it is to be competent with an 
expression or concept. One might for example say that to be competent with a concept is to be 
disposed to accept such-and-such principles involving it, or (Scharp’s preferred view) entitled to 
accept such-and-such governing principles it. This approach allows for meanings or concepts to be 
more fine-grained than intensions: for different sets of governing principles can correspond to one 
and the same intension. 
 
While as it is often discussed conceptual engineering concerns, precisely, concepts, this need not be 
taken very seriously.10 First, somewhat more neutrally one can speak of representational devices. 
And some may prefer to speak of words and their reference and extension, instead of speaking of 
concepts. Instead of asking which concepts we should have, one can ask which things we should have 
words for. Second, at least for some purposes one might sidestep representational devices 
altogether and instead directly speak in terms of that which such devices refer to or ascribe. Instead 
of saying, for example, “we should employ the concept GREEN and not the concept GRUE” one can say: 
we should focus on the property greenness and not the property grueness. (Note that questions 
analogous to those of the individuation of concepts arise also in the case of properties: can there be 
two properties which are necessarily co-instantiated yet are distinct?) I say “for some purposes”, 
both because there are not always corresponding worldly items (consider e.g. non-representational 
language and thought), and because sometimes what is at issue is not just what is represented but 
the manner in which it is represented.  
 
Who are “we”? In the above characterizations of Haslanger’s and Scharp’s projects, I have spoken of 
what “we” should do. But who are “we” here? Answers can differ depending on the project 
concerned. Scharp is at pains to emphasize that his proposal that the concept TRUTH be replaced 
concerns only what certain kinds of theorists should do, in the context of their theoretical 
investigations. He is not at all concerned with everyday uses of the concept. By contrast, Haslanger is 
at least in part concerned with what concept WOMAN should be used more broadly, even if her focus 
is on feminist theorizing.  
 
Retail or wholesale? The previous remarks are relevant also another natural question. Is the 
conceptual replacement or revision supposed to be retail – the proposal concerns only some uses of 
the concept – or wholesale – concern all uses of the concept? As already the above remarks on 
 
9 Where presumably one should specify: expressions that are not context-sensitive. Other questions may be 
asked about this gloss. Should we here include all kinds of subsentential expressions – including things like “on” 
and “to”? It may sound odd to speak of “the concept TO”; on the other hand, “to” makes a distinctive 
contribution to thoughts and one can evaluate this contribution as well as others, so the conceptual 
engineering questions arise here too. 
10 For example, Cappelen (2018) expresses skepticism about concepts while defending conceptual engineering. 
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Scharp indicate, Scharp’s revision is clearly retail. He only means to address the question of which 
truth concept should be employed in certain theoretical contexts. Whereas I don’t see Haslanger 
committing herself to a wholesale view, her view is at least closer to such a view. 
 
What is it for a concept to be better than, or preferable to, another?  First, it can be claimed that 
there are some possible outright defects that a concept can have and that a concept is generally 
better than another if the former is defect-free and the latter has one of these defects. Among such 
defects can be inconsistency and indeterminacy. Another defect might be that the use of the concept 
in some sense presupposes the truth of a false view, for example a false normative view.11 (Perhaps 
the use of a concept expressed by a racial slur presupposes the truth of some false racist belief. 
Perhaps the use of concepts like those expressed by “promiscuous” or “chaste” presuppose the truth 
of certain false moral beliefs.12) 
 
Second, there can be reasons that are more specific to the task at hand. A concept can be better than 
another in the sense that employing the former is more likely to generate positive social change. A 
concept can be better than another because it better tracks what is explanatorily powerful or 
inductively useful. A concept can be better than another simply because it is easier for creatures like 
us to work with. And so on. There will be many relevant dimensions along with a concept can be 
better than another. 
 
What is it to revise a concept? Sometimes in discussions of conceptual engineering, the focus is on 
revising a particular concept: before the changes the concept has a particular intension and maybe 
some particular governing principles, and after the changes the concept has a different intension and 
maybe different governing principles. Such talk invites questions about what changes a concept can 
undergo and still remain the same concept. Can a concept really survive a change in intension or 
governing principles? My own view is that such questions are not very important. There are simply 
different ways of individuating concepts, and so long as we are clear on which method of 
individuation we choose, nothing of interest hinges on the choice. If we are strict about concept 
identity then what some people are speak of as one concept undergoing changes is in fact the 
replacement of a concept by another, related one. I myself gravitate toward such strict individuation; 
but I do not see my favoring that as my taking a stance on a theoretically significant issue. 
 
At any rate, not all changes to our overall conceptual repertoire in the spirit of the Nietzsche passage 
above would be instances of the kind of concept change just discussed, even for those happy with 
the idea that there is such concept change. Sometimes there is arguably genuine conceptual 
innovation, where a concept is added such that there is no earlier counterpart of the concept. 
Sometimes there may be cause for simple concept deletion: some concept is dropped, and no 
concept is added specifically to replace it. 
 
Having and employing concepts. Independently of the issues of conceptual change mentioned above 
there are good questions about what it is to have and to employ a concept. Consider the concept 
which Haslanger proposes to identify as the concept WOMAN. There is a sense in which we had this 
concept even before Haslanger entered the scene. We had the concepts SUBORDINATION, etc., and we 
grasped the relevant means of forming complex concepts from simpler ones. So in what sense is 
 
11 In an intuitive sense of “presupposes”. The suggestion is not necessarily that this is presupposition in any of 
the technical senses standardly employed in philosophy of language and linguistics. 
12 Needless to say, these are just brief illustrations. There are alternative views on the examples mentioned. For 
example, maybe the concept expressed by a slur word is the same as that expressed by the corresponding 
neutral word: the racism expressed through the use of a racial slur is expressed through other mechanisms 
than through the concept used. (Maybe – see, e.g., Nunberg (2018) and Bolinger (2017) – the use conveys 
racism because it is common knowledge that this is the racists’ preferred word.)  
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what Haslanger proposes a conceptual novelty? There are distinctions to be drawn here. The 
following gestures towards what one relevant distinction might be: although we had all the 
constituent concepts and grasped their mode of combination, and so in a sense had the complex 
concept all along, we have not so far actually employed these complex concept, and starting to 
employ it is a change in our practices. Needless to say, more can be said about how to draw the 
relevant distinction. 
 
These distinctions are relevant to some stated motivations for conceptual engineering. Burgess and 
Plunkett (2013) say that one central motivation for conceptual engineering (or “conceptual ethics”, 
as they put it) is that which concepts we have “fixes what thoughts we can think” – “our conceptual 
repertoire determines not only what beliefs we can have but also what hypotheses we can entertain, 
what desires we can form, what plans we can make on the basis of such mental states, and 
accordingly constrains what we can hope to accomplish in the world”. But to the extent that the 
engineering concerns which concepts we more easily or readily employ, and not which concepts we 
have, some of this rhetoric should arguably be tempered. Already the point that some concepts are 
more easily and readily used than others is relevant – there may be good reasons to modify what 
concepts are easily and readily used – but it shouldn’t be conflated with points about which concepts 
we have in the first place. 
 
4. Concepts and words 
Above I mentioned that instead of asking which concepts we should employ, one can ask about 
reference and extension, and ask which things we should have words for. Now, even two theorists 
who agree about which concepts to employ and about things we should have words for can sharply 
disagree about which words should be used for what. It is important to distinguish between different 
kinds of questions that arise. Some questions concern what to have labels and descriptions for; 
others concern what labels and descriptions to use. While questions of the former kind arguably are 
more central to conceptual engineering, questions of the latter kind also come up.13  
 
Cappelen (2018) prominently discusses what he calls lexical effects in connection with conceptual 
engineering. Examples he mentions to illustrate the phenomenon, are that of naming a child ‘Hitler’, 
the use and importance of brand names, and the conception of slurs given which their slurring 
effects are due not to semantic features but simply due to which labels are being used.14 
 
Especially in connection with Haslanger’s project, the question has come up of whether one should 
retain the old word for the revised concept. Should we use “woman” for the concept that Haslanger 
devises or not? Haslanger herself says,  
 
…if our goal is to identify a concept that serves our broader purposes, then the question of 
terminology is primarily a pragmatic and sometimes a political one: should we employ the terms 
of ordinary discourse to refer to our theoretical categories, or instead make up new terms? The 
issue of terminological appropriation is especially important, and especially sensitive, when the 
terms in question designate categories of social identity such as ‘race’ and ‘gender’. 
 
…by appropriating the everyday terminology of race and gender, the analyses I’ve offered invite 
us to acknowledge the force of oppressive systems in framing our personal and political identities. 
Each of us has some investment in our race and gender: I am a White woman. On my accounts [of 
race and gender], this claim locates me within social systems that in some respects privilege and 
in some respects subordinate me. Because gender and racial inequality are not simply a matter of 
 
13 In addition to what is discussed in the main text, see, e.g., Sterken (forthcoming). 
14 Cappelen (2018), p. 123f. 
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public policy but implicate each of us at the heart of our self-understandings, the terminological 
shift calls us to reconsider who we think we are.15 
 
No doubt terminology is important, for example in cases like those of race and gender. But there is 
still something that might seem problematic about what Haslanger says: “Each of us has some 
investment in our race and gender: I am a White woman. On my accounts, this claim locates me 
within social systems that in some respects privilege and in some respects subordinate me”. Here 
one starts with a particular claim, in the case of Haslanger that expressed by the sentence “I am a 
white woman”. What are claims? It is natural to identify claims as propositions. If I say “snow is 
white” and a German speaker says “Schnee ist weiss” we are making the same claim; that is, we 
assert the same proposition. If claims are propositions, then what Haslanger speaks of is what a 
particular proposition does on her accounts of gender and race. But a different reaction is to say that 
before Haslanger’s proposed conceptual and terminological revision, “I am a white woman” 
expresses one proposition and after the revision has been implemented, it expresses another. One 
may then be concerned that there is no one proposition such that we are invested in that 
proposition pre-revision, and that then that very proposition is such that given a revisionary account 
of it, that proposition locates the speaker in a social system in the way described.16  
 
Some prominent criticisms of Haslanger have focused on terminology (see, e.g., Katharine Jenkins 
(2016)). Critics have fastened on the fact that Haslanger’s definition of “woman” seems to exclude 
trans women, and they have objected to this consequence of the view. This criticism, even if on 
target, has to do primarily with the label associated with the concept. If Haslanger instead had used a 
made-up label for the concept she characterizes, this would not have been an issue – at least not so 
long as Haslanger also allowed for another concept which would be labeled “woman”, under which 
trans women would fall.17 
 
Jenkins proposes a revision of the concept WOMAN such that in the sense of the proposed concept 
WOMAN, trans women are “women”. This is meant as an improvement over Haslanger’s proposal. But 
one may worry that insofar the proposition regarding trans women that one seeks to defend is that 
trans woman indeed are women, one does not defend that proposition by proposing a new concept 
WOMAN such that “trans women are women” expresses a true proposition when “women” expresses 
the new concept. To believe otherwise is tantamount to think that if we call a dog’s tail a leg, a dog 
will have five legs. To defend the original claim one must defend that trans women are women in the 
ordinary, pre-revision sense of “woman”. Maybe that can be done – I am not weighing in on that 
issue – but concept revision does not make that case.18 
 
5. Doubts about conceptual engineering as a philosophical project 
When motivating attention to conceptual engineering, Plunkett and Cappelen (forthcoming) stress 
the ubiquity of concept use. Whatever cognitive activities we engage in, we employ concepts, and 
which concepts we employ matters to how we perform the activity in question. Plunkett and 
 
15 Haslanger (2000), p 47. 
16 Above I mentioned, only to set aside, the possibility of different individuations of concepts. There are parallel 
questions about the individuations of propositions. The formulation in the text presupposes that one and the 
same proposition cannot undergo changes in content. The underlying concern can be expressed even given a 
different individuation of propositions. Wasn’t what we were invested in the proposition with the content it 
had? (As opposed to: the proposition itself, whatever its content might come to be.) 
17 Haslanger does stress that the question of the usefulness of the concept she describes and the question of 
whether to use “woman” for that concept are independent questions. See, e.g., Haslanger (2000, p. 47) and 
(forthcoming a). 
18 Again (see previous footnote) the formulation in the text presupposes that one and the same proposition 
cannot undergo changes in content. Again the underlying concern can be expressed even given a different 
individuation of propositions. 
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Cappelen say that facts such as these “help underscore the potential significance of philosophical 
work done on conceptual engineering”.19 Now, they do say “potential”, but it is anyway important to 
stress that the central importance of concepts by no means immediately shows that there is a 
significant philosophical project of studying conceptual engineering. In this section I bring up three 
possible reasons for skepticism. 
 
(1) Not unified enough? Even if individual projects of conceptual engineering, such as Haslanger’s and 
Scharp’s, are of interest, one can think that these projects are dissimilar, in such a way that nothing is 
gained by treating these projects as parts of a bigger, unified project, conceptual engineering. The 
projects may be no more unified than the areas of philosophy of gender and race on the one hand 
and philosophy of logic on the other are unified. To be sure, in both cases, we talk about revising and 
replacing concepts, but the means of assessing the proposals are so different that there is no unified 
philosophical project there. There are of course general questions about concepts and their identity 
conditions (as well as about the legitimacy of concept talk in the first place), but these questions are 
so general that they have nothing to do with conceptual engineering per se. Plunkett and Cappelen 
suggest that the importance of questions about which concepts we use means that “work done on 
conceptual engineering” may be significant. But, relating back to the distinction drawn early on, even 
if individual projects involving engineering concepts may be significant, the general study of 
conceptual engineering is a different thing, and it is in regards to that study that one may be 
concerned about lack of unity. 
 
(2) Not philosophical enough? A second cause for doubt about conceptual engineering as a 
philosophical project concerns how philosophical the project properly is. Might not the question of 
how good or bad a concept is be a question of the actual consequences of employing it, as compared 
to employing other concepts – an empirical matter? And are not questions about how a concept is 
best implemented questions to be resolved empirically? Perhaps in each case one can to some 
extent speculate reasonably from the armchair; still, such speculation is no substitute for empirical 
work. It may be silly to police how the label “philosophy” should be used, but it still stands that the 
typical training of philosophers makes philosophers better equipped to address certain questions 
than to address others. 
 
Which concept WOMAN is best for particular feminist political purposes – whether we think of a 
concept WOMAN for working feminist theorists to use or we think of a concept WOMAN for the society 
at large to use – seems an eminently empirical matter. A project like Scharp’s can seem more non-
empirical in nature, for the problem identified in the case of the concept TRUTH is inconsistency, and 
it can be thought that empirical research is not needed to establish that inconsistency is a defect. But 
first, empirical work could still be needed to properly investigate which replacement concept or 
concepts are the most useful to employ. And second, while inconsistency certainly sounds like a 
defect, whether it is depends on what it is for a concept to be inconsistent - and there are different 
accounts of that. The way Scharp characterizes this, a concept is inconsistent exactly if competence 
with the concept entails being (defeasibly) entitled to accept principles which in fact lead to 
inconsistency.20 It is not obvious that this is cause for replacement. What is so bad if I employ a 
concept like that? My employing such a concept does not in any way mean that I believe 
contradictions, or am disposed to believe contradictions, or am in some sense committed to 
believing contradictions. But if the inconsistency of a concept is not generally a defect, the question 
of whether it is in a particular instance can be thought to turn on whether the inconsistency in fact 
leads to problems, and that is again an empirical issue. I will return to this below. 
 
 
19 Plunkett and Cappelen (forthcoming). 
20 Scharp (2013), p. 46. 
 8 
A different kind of reason for thinking that questions about what concepts should be revised are at 
bottom empirical is that much of what we use words to convey – and arguably much of what we use 
concepts to think – goes beyond what is literally expressed by those words and what is strictly part of 
the contents of those concepts. But then much of a word’s or concept’s value or disvalue can have to 
do with what else the word or concept is being used to do; and the question of what else it is used to 
do is empirical. 
 
Maybe some conceptual engineering projects are more philosophical in nature. What makes 
Haslanger’s and Scharp’s motivations for conceptual engineering seem empirical is the focus on 
purported practical benefits of a given kind. A completely different kind of “conceptual engineering” 
project focuses not on practical matters but on what a kind of ideal language would be like – the 
language our theory is stated in at the end of inquiry, or the language that most perspicuously 
represents what reality is fundamentally like. Such projects may be more philosophical, for an 
obvious reason: designing such a language is not very different from the project of considering what 
reality is fundamentally like, and that latter question is one where philosophy is traditionally seen as 
having contributions to make.21 
 
(3) No distinct subject matter? A third reason for doubt is that conceptual engineering is not a 
distinct subject matter. I already alluded to the fact that some relevant questions, about concepts 
and their identity conditions, are more general and do not concern conceptual engineering per se. 
Also some other questions that have come up in connection with conceptual engineering seem 
clearly just to be applications of more general points. For example, Simion (2018) argues that it is not 
permissible to revise concepts when there is ‘epistemic loss’, and she says that what she identifies is 
a wrong-kind-of-reasons problem familiar from elsewhere in the literature.22 Beliefs are to be 
assessed on their own, epistemic terms rather than in terms of all-things-considered considerations. 
Whatever the fate of Simion’s argument, it is clear that it turns on how epistemic value relates to 
other sorts of normative considerations.23 
 
6. Conceptual engineering questions 
One way for the friend of conceptual engineering to combat skepticism about conceptual 
engineering as a philosophical project is to, constructively, point to some philosophical questions 
that concern conceptual engineering as a general philosophical project, and emphasize the 
significance of these questions. Here are some questions she might point to. 
 
First, there is what has come to be called Strawson’s challenge.24 This is discussed in, e.g., Prinzing 
(2017), Cappelen (2018), and Dutilh Novaes (forthcoming). Here is Cappelen’s (2018) statement of 
the challenge: 
 
Change of extension and intension (and so also change of sense, if you believe in those) is a 
change of topic, so [projects involving conceptual revisions] are bound to fail. Even if the revisions 
 
21 If we focus on the ideal scenario kind of case, another concern arises. Ought we not, at the ideal stage, to 
employ all concepts? At the end of inquiry we will want to have catalogued all truths, so if there are any truths 
at all that we fail to include, even fairly useless ones, we have not done as well as we could. In an idealized 
scenario we do not need to choose which among all the truths to focus on. Dever (forthcoming) argues for 
“conceptual maximalism”, the view that we should employ all concepts; and, relatedly, for the view that we 
should work in “all languages”. He realizes that we of course cannot do everything at once, so that there will be 
choices about what to focus on here and now. The way I see it, his global maximalism is then a view about a 
kind of ideal theorizing. 
22 See, e.g., Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004). 
23 For discussion of Simion’s argument, see Catapang Podosky (forthcoming). 
24 So called because it arguably echoes themes from Strawson’s (1963) discussion of Carnap. 
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succeed, they do not provide us with a better way to talk about what we were talking about; they 
simply change the topic.25 
 
The concern is this. When we engage in conceptually engineering, we revise or replace concepts, and 
when we do so, we change the topic. But if we change the topic, then we no longer address the 
questions we originally were asking. 
 
This is a general concern, applying equally to projects like Haslanger’s and to projects like Scharp’s. 
And it applies specifically to conceptual engineering, and isn’t equally an issue for all theories in some 
sense about concepts, for it concerns precisely conceptual change. Cappelen’s own response to the 
challenge involves defending a liberal notion of sameness of topic given which the topic is not 
changed. My own view on the challenge is that it is a non-issue. Whether it matters that the topic is 
changed depends on what our purposes are. If the concept revision is supposed to be justified by 
moral and political aims, then the chief question is whether those aims are better served by the new 
concept. If it is supposed to be justified by concern about explanatory and predictive success then 
the chief question is whether the new concept better serves that aim. Change of topic is a bad thing 
exactly insofar as, among other purposes we do or should have, there is the purpose of saying 
something about the old topic. But why should that always be among our purposes? Maybe we are 
not answering the original questions asked. But maybe the old questions weren’t the right ones to 
ask anyway. 
 
When motivating Strawson’s challenge, Cappelen quotes, among others, Peter Ludlow (2005). What 
Ludlow actually says is: “[F]irst, and most obviously, any investigation into the nature of knowledge 
which did not conform to some significant degree with the semantics of the term ‘knows’ would 
simply be missing the point.”26 Of course, if an investigation really is an investigation into the nature 
of knowledge (to stick with the case Ludlow focuses on), then we had better make sure we not stray 
from the target, the nature of knowledge. But a conceptual engineer concerned with knowledge 
could well say: what we ought to be concerned with, e.g. for the purposes of the relevant kind of 
epistemic evaluation, isn’t knowledge but knowledge*. Then we ought not tie our investigation to 
the nature of knowledge but should shift the focus to the nature of knowledge* – at least so long as 
what we are interested in is what is best for the purpose of the relevant kind of epistemic 
evaluation.27  
 
Second, recently (e.g. in Cappelen (2018), Koch (2018)) there has been some work on whether 
externalism, the view that the meaning of an expression as used by a speaker is constitutively 
determined in part by factors outside her, makes the project of actively working for conceptual 
change unfeasible: speakers have no control over conceptual change. This is a question of the 
compatibility of externalism with conceptual engineering. Of potential relevance here is that there 
are different kinds of externalism. Sometimes externalists stress the causal environment; sometimes 
it is the speaker’s social environment that matters. Some externalists think some facts about 
meaning and content can be determined by future facts. Some externalists may think it is in the 
nature of meaning and content that it is determined in part by external factors where others may 
hold the more moderate view that it is in virtue of our implicit decisions and conventions that 
 
25 Cappelen (2018), p. 100. 
26 Ludlow 2005, p. 13; quoted in Cappelen (2018), p. 98. 
27 In fact, even Strawson himself says, “[I]t seems prima facie evident that to offer formal explanations [i.e. 
Carnap-style explications] of key terms of scientific theories to one who seeks philosophical illumination of 
essential concepts of non-scientific discourse, is to do something utterly irrelevant – is a sheer 
misunderstanding” (1963, p. 505). Notice the relativization: the point essentially concerns what serves the 
purposes of someone who “seeks philosophical illumination of essential concepts of non-scientific discourse”. 
What if one simply does not have that aim?  
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external factors turn out to be relevant (we have decided to let our concept WATER work in such a 
way that with respect to every possible world, it is true of the actual watery stuff. The problems 
caused by externalism are at least more dramatic given the first kind of view. 
 
Again, is it not largely an empirical issue to what extent externalism presents problems? One 
possibility is that, for example, persuasive arguments for conceptual revision can have such impact 
on the community that even by externalist standards conceptual change is taking place, and since 
argumentation is the driving force, this is under our control. How likely it is that argumentation has 
that effect is an empirical issue.28 
 
Third, maybe, despite differences between conceptual engineering projects, there can be some 
informative principles governing how to evaluate concepts, and when to revise or replace concepts. 
For example, Alexis Burgess and David Plunkett have discussed the question of under what 
conditions a given concept can itself be legitimately be used in discussions of whether that very 
concept should be replaced or abandoned.29 If a concept is employed in an argument for retaining 
that concept, that may be seen as problematic: it is, so to speak, the concept itself that vouches for 
its innocence (or that is the concern). And if the concept is employed in an argument to the effect 
that the concept ought to be revised or replaced, that too might be seen as a problem: if the concept 
itself cannot be trusted, why should an argument that employs the concept? I am stating these 
questions only briefly. As stated they face the concern that a lot hinges on the specific supposed 
reasons for why the concept should be replaced, and what the argument for replacement looks like. 
For example, if what is at issue is only that some other concept is more explanatory than C or the fact 
that C is more vague than relevant alternatives, there is no immediate reason at all to suspect that 
there is something amiss with using C in an argument that C should be retained. 
 
Fourth, there are questions about the limits of conceptual engineering. In his (2011), David Chalmers 
introduced the notion of a bedrock concept. As Cappelen (2018) discusses, this can be thought to 
have implications regarding conceptual engineering. The main topic of Chalmers (2011) is that of 
verbal disputes. As Chalmers notes, a strategy for deciding whether a given dispute is verbal is to 
state the dispute with the key term replaced by other terms, and see if the dispute remains. If the 
dispute goes away, it was verbal. If it remains, the dispute wasn’t verbal. But having stated this 
“method of elimination”, Chalmers notes an apparent limitation: in some cases it seems that the 
dispute cannot be faithfully restated without the use of the key term. Here he illustrates this in the 
case of moral disputes: 
 
…we can bar ‘ought’ and introduce ‘ought1’ and ‘ought2’, which are stipulated to apply to acts 
with the deontological and the consequence property respectively. Is there a residual 
disagreement now? 
As we proceed, the disagreement gets harder and harder to state. It is plausible that once all 
moral terms are gone, no disagreement can be stated. We might agree on all the nonmoral 
properties of the relevant actions but still disagree on whether it is right. 
In the case of ‘semantics’, ‘physicalism’, and so on, this situation suggested a verbal dispute. 
Should we likewise diagnose a verbal dispute here? Intuitively, the answer is no. For all we have 
said, moral disputes are substantive disputes. Instead, we have simply exhausted the relevant 
vocabulary. It appears that at a certain point (perhaps once we have fixed on the appropriate 
 
28 Cappelen (2018, p. 82) also points out that problems arise even given internalism. We need not have control 
over what concepts we employ even given internalism. As in the case of externalism, it is an empirical matter 
to what extent we do have such control. It is not a given that we have control over the internal factors that the 
internalist focuses on. 
29 See Burgess and Plunkett (2013a), Burgess (2014), and Burgess (forthcoming). 
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moral “ought”), we have reached bedrock: a substantive dispute involving a concept so basic that 
there is no hope of clarifying the dispute in more basic terms.30 
 
Chalmers characterizes a “bedrock dispute” as “a substantive dispute for which no underlying 
dispute can be found by the method of elimination”, and “bedrock expressions” are such that “some 
disputes are bedrock with respect to those expressions” (where “a dispute is bedrock with respect to 
E when the dispute is substantive and there is no dispute not involving E (and analogous in other 
respects) that underlies the original dispute”).  
 
There is much to say about what Chalmers says about bedrock. Here I confine myself to discussing 
relevance to conceptual engineering. Cappelen (2018) brings up Chalmers’ notion of bedrock as 
relevant to conceptual engineering. He says that in his terminology, bedrock expressions are 
“expressions that cannot be engineered”; they are “conceptual foundations where there’s no option 
of moving to a neighboring property”.31 He then goes on to say that he disagrees with Chalmers 
about whether there are any bedrock expressions. I think Cappelen at least overstates the relevance 
to conceptual engineering. If E is a bedrock expression then one cannot eliminate the expression 
without a sense of loss: one cannot faithfully state what was at issue in theses involving E when E is 
not used. But one can certainly still in principle argue that even so, E should be eliminated or revised. 
The loss in question is a loss we can and should live with. 
 
I have myself presented arguments regarding the limits of conceptual engineering, both suggesting 
that it becomes problematic to pose the conceptual engineer’s questions when it comes to 
foundationally important normative concepts, and that there is a sense in which there are no 
alternatives to the notions of truth and existence – there are, in a certain sense, no alternative 
suitably TRUTH-like and EXISTENCE-like concepts.32 In brief, the considerations are these. When it comes 
to truth, the question is what it would be for a community to employ a concept which plays the role 
of our concept TRUTH but still is not coextensive with it. In the case of existence, the point is that 
differences in what EXISTENCE-like concept a community uses has ripple effects for the rest of that 
community’s system of concepts, so that selectively replacing EXISTENCE by some other EXISTENCE-like 
concept is not possible. The case of foundationally important normative concepts is the one I have 
discussed in the most detail – see my book Eklund (2017) – and there the point is, in brief, that it is 
unclear what the conceptual engineering could reasonably concern. When we ask, “which OUGHT-like 
concept ought we to use, our actual concept OUGHT, or an alternative?”, the obvious problem with 
the question is that the answer to the question will likely depend on what concept we use the 
“ought” to express. 
 
Cappelen brings up my arguments alongside those of Chalmers as arguments to the effect that some 
concepts cannot be engineered. Without getting into detail regarding those arguments of mine and 
their worth, let me just emphasize that the same sorts of remarks apply to them as applied to 
Chalmers’ arguments. Even if my arguments are completely correct as far as they go, and even if they 
do establish certain limits to conceptual engineering, certain forms of conceptual engineering are 
possible also when it comes to these concepts. There are still questions about whether one should 
employ a TRUTH-like or EXISTENCE-like concept at all. And in the case of normative concepts, my 
argument does not even purport to establish that we could not replace OUGHT by some alternative, 
OUGHT*: the problem rather has to do with what kind of comparison we are engaged in when 
proposing the replacement. 
 
7. Different conceptions of meaning and content 
 
30 Chalmers (2011), p. 543. 
31 Cappelen (2018), p. 194. 
32 See, e.g., Eklund (2015), (2017) and (forthcoming). 
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Here is a rough distinction between two different ways of looking at concepts and meaning. On a 
referentialist view, there is nothing more to (descriptive) meaning than intensions. If two expressions 
have the same intension then they have the same meaning. On an inferentialist view, some 
inferences are in part and somehow constitutive of concepts or meaning. (The terminology is from 
Williamson (2009).) The inferentialist cuts things more finely than the referentialist, for two 
expressions can have the same intension while being associated with different constitutive 
inferences. In the conceptual engineering discussion, Cappelen and Haslanger are referentialists.33 
Cappelen even expresses doubts about the propriety of talk about concepts. Scharp is a prominent 
inferentialist (and I myself am attracted to inferentialism).34  
 
These differences in turn generate differences in how to think of conceptual engineering. For the 
referentialist, the engineering has to do with changes in what we talk about (we shift from using an 
expression with one intension to using that or another expression with another intension), and with 
things that aren’t strictly on the meaning or content side at all – what Cappelen calls lexical effects. 
For the inferentialist, there are more options: the inferentialist can also focus on what inferences are 
constitutive of an expression’s meaning or a concept. Whether one spells out constitutivity in 
psychological or epistemic terms, there is a possibility that constitutive inferences are not always 
necessarily truth-preserving, and they may even engender contradiction. Inferences we are disposed 
to accept may not be truth-preserving. Inferences we are entitled to make may not be truth-
preserving. Both Scharp and myself hold that the liar paradox is generated by constitutive principles 
(together with undeniable truths). It is natural to think that when a concept’s constitutive principles 
are false or contradictory, the concepts needs to be revised or replaced.35  
 
 
33 See, e.g., Haslanger (forthcoming (a)) and Cappelen (2018). Haslanger emphasizes that the content of a 
concept is a “partition of logical space”, and genuine conceptual revision amounts to changing what partition 
of logical space the term or concept represents” [reference]. (Haslanger contrasts genuine revision – what she 
calls informational or semantic amelioration – with epistemic amelioration, where we simply “improve our 
understanding of the informational content of the concept” [reference]. She goes on to emphasize: 
 
There are no “core commitments” associated with words that cannot be overturned or negotiated. 
Although in some sense we represent the world – propositions are abstract entities that carry information 
and are, to that extent, representational – the “mode of representation” is not part of the informational 
content of what we say and think. [reference] 
 
In her forthcoming (b), Haslanger speaks of concepts as “clusters of dispositions” [reference], and distinguishes 
concepts from their contents. But at the same time, she – both in that work and other works – expresses 
skepticism about the idea that all users of a given concept have the same dispositions. For example, in her 
forthcoming (b), she says, “possession of the concept may occur by virtue of different cognitive mechanisms 
and give rise to very different dispositions in different individuals” [reference]. The claims seem hard to square 
with each other. It is tempting to assume that her real view is only that to have some suitable cluster of 
dispositions (and this is also how she puts it in her forthcoming (a)). But maybe the idea is that even if different 
individuals possessing the concept have different dispositions, “cluster of dispositions” is so general that the 
individuals count as possessing the same disposition cluster: that would make consistent sense of how 
Haslanger puts things in different recent papers. Despite possible complications, I will speak of Haslanger as a 
refentialist, reserving further discussion of her precise view to footnotes. 
34 I use Williamson’s terminology because I find it useful, and it has caught on. However, the label 
“inferentialism” is not perfect. In the relevant sense, Frege is supposed to be an inferentialist: Frege’s senses 
cut more finely that reference. But Frege does not strictly focus on inferences. 
35 And for anyone who thinks this it might also be natural to go further and hold that whenever a concept’s 
constitutive principles are immodest in the sense that they require something substantive of reality then the 
concept needs to be revised or replaced, even if what is required happens to be true. The supposed thought 
would be that substantive matters should not be settled conceptually. (Naturally, there is a question of how 
best to understand “substantive”.) 
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Haslanger’s referentialism may seem to sit ill with some possible motivations for her proposed 
ameliorative analysis of ‘woman’. Mark Richard (forthcoming) summarizes Haslanger’s underlying 
thought as follows: 
 
The, or an important, purpose of the concept woman is to subordinate people on the basis of 
their (perceived) female properties. We shouldn’t be subordinating people on this basis; indeed, 
we should be fighting against such subordination. One way to do this is to reformulate the 
concept so that, so to speak, its noxious purpose is part of its definition. This will put the 
purposes for which the concept is actually being used front and center, allowing us to fight 
gender subordination. We should therefore understand what it is to be a woman as being 
someone who is systematically subordinated on the basis of (perceived) female properties.36 
 
Richard’s summary seems generally apt to me. But what does it mean for a referentialist to say that a 
purpose, or function,37 is part of the definition of a concept? If Haslanger were an inferentialist, at 
least of the psychological kind, then she could in principle say that it is part of competence with (her 
revised concept) ‘woman’ to have, or be disposed to have, certain beliefs about oppression; and the 
facts of oppression are in that way rendered salient by the concept. But given that all there is to the 
concept expressed by ‘woman’ is its intension there is no way that the descriptive information that 
Haslanger uses to describe the intension of the concept is itself part of the concept, or such that it is 
part of competence with the concept to believe or even know of the descriptive information in 
question.38  
 
Actually, there are complications regarding the connection between concepts and the beliefs of 
concept users even given inferentialism. On prominent versions of inferentialism, the connection 
between concept possession and beliefs is complex. If constitutivity is spelled out in epistemic terms 
– a principle is constitutive of a concept if competence with the concept entails that one is entitled to 
believe the principle – then it doesn’t follow from the fact that women are oppressed is constitutive 
of the concept WOMAN that anyone competent with the concept must believe that women are 
oppressed. And the most plausible version of the psychological view says only that competence with 
a concept involves having a disposition to believe the constitutive principles and not that 
competence involves actually believing these principles. In the background of the discussion of what 
is the best version of inferentialism are Timothy Williamson’s arguments (see, e.g., his (2007)), to the 
effect that for every principle that can be regarded as concept-constitutive one can imagine users 
seemingly competent with the principle who do not believe the principle in question. The proposed 
versions of inferentialism are intended to get around Williamson’s objections.39  
 
It might be useful to compare Haslanger’s proposal that the concept WOMAN should be revised with 
the different proposal that one should instill belief in the relevant sort of claim, without necessarily 
 
36 [reference] 
37 ”Function” is arguably better in the context than Richard’s ”purpose”. 
38 Haslanger (forthcoming (b)) says that concepts are dispositions (see above, fn33), and given that view there 
is more to play with. Descriptive information can then be associated with the concept, by virtue of being the 
descriptive information that it is part of competence with the concept to accept. But even in her forthcoming 
(b), Haslanger repeats her point that there are no “core commitments” associated with words. 
39 When Haslanger says that there are no “core commitments” associated with words, what she holds is that 
there are no commitments that “cannot be overturned or negotiated”. An inferentialist of the kind we are now 
considering can cheerfully agree. 
In the context of her discussion, Haslanger’s remark still seems to support a referentialist 
interpretation, since the alternative, positive picture she offers is one where “our utterances and our mental 
states do not have senses or concepts as their content “and what we believe are propositions, understood “as 
functions from possible circumstances to truth values, or equivalently, as sets of possible situations”. 
(Haslanger forthcoming (a) [reference]; the latter passage Haslanger quotes from Stalnaker (1998), p. 343.) 
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revising concepts. What about simply instilling beliefs to the effect that those people with observed 
or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of a female’s biological role in reproduction 
tend to be systematically subordinated along some dimension (economic, political, legal, social, etc.), 
they are “marked” by the dominant ideology (in C) as a target for this treatment? This belief can, in 
principle, be salient independently of what concept one uses “woman” or any other label for. An 
opponent of the strategy of revising concepts can say that one should instead focus directly on 
beliefs like this. The project of revising concepts is of less importance. Of course, it can be that using 
Haslanger’s concept can play an important role when it comes to instilling this belief and raising it to 
salience. It is not clear to me to what extent what I have called attention to is a problem for 
Haslanger: she may be perfectly fine with the claim that what is of main importance is beliefs and 
their salience, and concept change is just an indirect, fallible means to that end. Still it is worth 
stressing that the connection between on the one hand concepts used and, on the other, beliefs and 
their salience is by no means straightforward. 
 
Let me also briefly consider how Scharp’s project looks in light of the discussion of referentialism and 
inferentialism. Scharp’s view is inconsistent with referentialism: since referentialism does not 
countenance constitutive principles, referentialism does not countenance inconsistent constitutive 
principles. And as earlier noted, Scharp favors a particular form of inferentialism. Inferentialism in 
either form discussed allows that there can be false and even inconsistent constitutive principles, 
and it can be thought that if some constitutive principles for a concept are false – or even 
inconsistent – then the concept in question must be revised. Conceptual engineering enters the 
stage. But the connection is not immediate or obvious. If competence required actual belief in 
constitutive principles the connection would be at least somewhat stronger: but what is so bad about 
being entitled to believe constitutive principles, or about merely having dispositions to believe these 
principles?40  
 
8. Concluding remarks 
My aim here has been to summarize some main theoretical issues regarding conceptual engineering. 
Some of my remarks have been critical. I have doubts about conceptual engineering as an (even 
near) unified philosophical project, and I have doubts about the philosophical significance of some 
questions that prominently have come up in connection with conceptual engineering. 
 
But doubts about a unified philosophical project of conceptual engineering are compatible with 
enthusiasm about individual projects that concern conceptual engineering. Moreover, there is a 
distinction to be drawn. There is the prescriptive project of determining which concepts actually to 
employ, for such-and-such purposes, and the evaluative project of evaluating how good certain 
concepts are along different dimensions. Empirical issues arise most centrally in connection with the 
prescriptive projects. What are the actual consequences of employing this concept instead of that? 
How feasible is it to ensure that we employ a given concept rather than another? When it comes to 
the evaluative project, there are different kinds of evaluations. Some certainly turn on empirical 
issues. But many dimensions of evaluation are such that the evaluations need not turn on such 
issues. The evaluations can be independent of the questions about implementation. 
Some of the doubts expressed have concerned the prescriptive project specifically; some more 
purely evaluative projects emerge relatively unscathed. 
 
 
40 These remarks are also relevant to the issue raised above, fn35, of whether it is a defect in a concept if its 
constitutive principles require something substantive of reality. The intuitive argument against this stated 
above was that we might not want substantive matters to be settled conceptually. But given what is now 
stressed regarding constitutivity we can see that the talk of what is “settled” is misguided. Even if a principle is 
constitutive in the sense at issue, a thinker possessing the concept can come to reject it as untrue. 
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The doubts should also be seen in light of the fact that in other ways I am very positively inclined 
toward the trend towards conceptual engineering. What concepts we use is important, and the 
concepts we have may not be the best concepts along all relevant dimensions or for all relevant 
purposes. Philosophy focusing only on our actual concepts and the things in the world they stand for 
threatens to be an unintentionally parochial enterprise. 
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